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COURTHOUSE SECURITY RESOURCE CENTER

The Wisconsin Partners

Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs Association

**U.S. Marshal's Office
Western District**

Director of State Courts Office

**Office of the Chief Justice
Supreme Court**

Office of Justice Assistance

**Fox Valley Technical College's
Criminal Justice Department**



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“There is a need to raise awareness on the part of a wide spectrum of court personnel, county personnel, and law enforcement to *identify* common issues, *discuss* concerns, and *pursue* solutions.”

Michael J. Skwierawski
Chief Judge, Wisconsin District One

The mission of the Wisconsin Court Security Resource Center is to create safer courthouses for occupants and visitors by providing training, conducting research, and information exchange to promote collaboration among law enforcement, court personnel and policy makers.

The Resource Center will provide:

Training:

In-service and conferences
Safety officer certification
Training of trainers

Research:

Standardized incident reporting
Online reporting
Best practices

Technical Assistance:

Re-modeling considerations
New construction considerations
Building/facility evaluation
Site surveys
Employee surveys and needs assessment
Emergency planning



Courthouse Security Training Program

The Wisconsin Model

designed and delivered by:

The Wisconsin Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs Association
U.S. Marshal's Office of the Western District of Wisconsin
Wisconsin Director of State Courts Office
Office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance
Fox Valley Technical College - Criminal Justice Center

The Courthouse Security Training Program, which originated in Wisconsin, was created to improve courthouse security, provide consistency of information, and strengthen the ongoing operation of Courthouse Security and Facilities Committees statewide. This was accomplished through the development of partnerships, technical resources and training.

Training Goals:

The overall goal of this training is to establish the appropriate level of protection, by providing teams from courthouse facilities with the information and tools necessary to implement a court security program.

Training Objectives:

- To increase court security knowledge and awareness.
- To improve the mechanism for providing training concerning courthouse security.
- To increase the number of court security trainers in each judicial administrative district.


Courthouse Training Topics:

- Fundamentals of security and environmental design
- Policy and procedure development
- Contingency planning
- Conducting facility assessment and analysis
- Threat assessment
- Security of exhibits and firearms
- Security equipment
- Major events coordination
- Developing courthouse-wide security plans
- Forming and coordinating response teams

Training of Trainers Topics:

- In-service planning
- Adult learning theory
- Effective instructional techniques
- Visual aids and training materials

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COURTHOUSE SECURITY MANUAL

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Preface

In the 1990s, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed security issues affecting county courthouses throughout the state. As a result, Supreme Court Rules 70.38 and 70.39 were enacted (*see Appendix, page 111*). In these rules the Supreme Court outlined basic standards for courthouse security, as well as facilities and staffing. A major goal of this rule was to promote cooperation. The rule states:

This rule is promulgated by the supreme court to promote communication among circuit courts, county officials, court planners, architects and contractors concerning court facilities issues. It is intended to be a statement of general purpose and procedure which establishes a flexible framework for courts' participation in decision-making regarding court facilities while recognizing the wide range of needs and circumstances which exist in counties across the state.

The *Wisconsin Courthouse Security Manual* is an example of this type of collaboration. The Wisconsin Sheriff's and Deputy Sheriff's Association (WSDSA), the U.S. Marshal's Office of the Western District of Wisconsin, the Director of State Courts, and the Office of the Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court teamed up to define the essential components of a model courthouse security program. The result is the *Wisconsin Courthouse Security Manual*. Its purpose is to equip law enforcement officers, judges, clerks of court, and other county officials with the information necessary to customize a comprehensive security plan for their courthouses.

This material is not intended to replace or change the meaning of any existing rule, policy, or procedure. Any disparity or change between this manual and existing state policies and procedures will be deferred to and governed by those same official notices and publications. The comments and recommendations contained herein are not intended to mandate policies or procedures. Rather, they are intended to foster a positive and responsive dialogue among those officials and persons reviewing and assessing security needs for their respective courthouses.

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Introduction

Courthouse security encompasses deterrence, detection, and prevention. Courthouse security must serve the objectives of the judicial process, not dominate them. One of the major objectives of this manual, and the training programs that must accompany its use, is to attain an appropriate balance between access to court facilities and public safety. It is imperative that the people see courthouses in Wisconsin as places where problems are resolved. The court system can ill afford to convey a message of fear from fortress-like facilities. That is why this manual stresses training and awareness. Proper and effective security design of courthouses can contribute substantially to the safety of persons within the courthouse. The more effective the deterrent, the lower the incidence of security problems. Finally, courthouse security seeks to limit damage that may be caused by an action or a threat.

To help counties develop and maintain a comprehensive courthouse security programs, the *Wisconsin Courthouse Security Manual* contains both general and specific information on a number of areas believed essential to establishing a model court security program. It is meant to be used by court security committees to enhance court security.

Security program responsibilities are both considerable and important. The manual should be considered a starting, and not an ending point. The manual provides instructions and examples on executing court security operational assignments in an exemplary manner. When reviewing the manual, please note that individual chapters should not be interpreted nor considered exclusive of one another. They are intended to complement one another. In order to maintain a high level of proficiency, court security program managers will need to continuously seek out additional program-specific experience, source documents, training, and professional associations.

Effective courthouse security requires a strong partnership between the courts and law enforcement. It is incumbent upon state and local government to implement these practical standards for a safe and secure courthouse environment for the public, employees, and officials, and to augment this collaborative effort by involving the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government.

Specific security requirements inevitably will vary from location to location due to local conditions and changing circumstances. This manual is designed to accommodate these differences while still enabling a statewide improvement in courthouse security. Ultimately, judges, court staff, and law enforcement officials serve as the protectors of citizens who use our court system.

Developing Contingency Safety & Security Plans

CHAPTER 7

All agencies and individuals responsible for maintaining the safety and security of the courthouse and its occupants must be prepared to react to emergency and potential-emergency situations like bomb threats, hostage situations, and fires. Following are suggested guidelines and issues to consider when developing contingency security and safety plans.

Contingency Safety & Security Plans

Each court facility should have an individual building security plan that covers all established considerations and features unique to that facility. Building security plans should explicitly cover and provide for the planned and organized responses of law enforcement and emergency personnel to duress alarms, threats, hostage situations, assaults, vandalism, dangerous individuals, prisoner escapes, etc. Areas of contingency responsibilities (individual and shared) for the sheriff, police department, and building management should be clearly defined and outlined. The courthouse security and facility committee should be knowledgeable about, and coordinate, the building security plan with the county property manager and include representatives of all agencies that occupy the courthouse. This is especially important in courthouses that share facilities with non-court agencies. Where the courts and court-support agencies are the sole occupants of a building, the court security and facility committee also may function as the building security committee. The security and facilities committee should evaluate existing security plans and practices and make recommendations for improvements, and be aware of the county's Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP). An OEP is designed to minimize the danger to life and property arising from the effects of attack, fire, flood, explosion, serious weather conditions, demonstrations, and other disasters. For more information on OEPs, see *Chapter 5: Security Issues for the Office of the Clerk of Court & Other Courthouse Offices*.

Realizing that sheriff and/or police department personnel may be called upon to take command (temporarily or permanently) during emergency situations, personnel from both departments should be familiar with the courthouse's design/layout, contingency plan, security systems, and security-related policies and procedures.

In the event of a critical incident and/or crisis situation occurring within a courthouse the sheriff and/or police department should implement the contingency plan which consists of the following:

- The immediate response (inclusion of those areas of specifically required coverage) to an incident by law enforcement and security personnel. Assignment of an on-site supervisor to coordinate and ensure implementation of the plan.
- Direct critical incident review and assessment.
- Emergency notification telephone numbers of pre-designated officials. Notification itself will be conducted by senior management or personnel previously authorized. In absence of senior management officials, responding personnel must initiate notification procedures.

- Additional emergency notification telephone numbers of State of Wisconsin and Federal Law Enforcement Agencies. Information stating response times and the provision of specialized emergency services (i.e. SWAT, medical support, urban recovery teams, tactical teams, etc.) is included.
- Activation procedures and operational requirements for security command posts.
- Maps, diagrams, blueprints, and floor plans of all entrances/exits locations for the courthouse.
- Names, addresses, and 24-hour contact numbers of respective facility management, utility, and maintenance personnel. Exact locations of utility, telecommunications, electrical, HVAC, boiler, and maintenance rooms are to be noted on facility blueprints and floor plans.
- Roster containing names, addresses, telephone and pager numbers of all sheriff and/or police officials. Individual emergency locator forms are secured at respective facilities.
- Evacuation procedures, to include designated areas of refuge, for judicial officers, staff, employees, and the general public. Security personnel assignments are contained within this section.
- Photographs (aerial, exterior, and interior) of the courthouse and adjacent grounds.
- Copies of the courthouse OEP.

In addition to the policy and procedural guidelines previously stated in this section, the following are also recommended for plan inclusion:

- videos of courthouse interior and exterior¹;
- state, city, and county maps;
- description and location of security systems;
- key control registers;
- concurrent interagency jurisdiction agreements;
- annual crime statistical summaries;
- courthouse threat and risk assessments;
- operations security (OPSEC) assessments;
- local infrastructure and transportation support;
- courthouse security surveys;
- emergency medical center locations.

Judicial Personnel Profiles

Profiles should be maintained for each member of the judiciary. The information contained within each profile is an integral part of courthouse contingency plans. Consequently, profile copies are secured in the same manner and locations as contingency plans. An example is included in the Appendix on page 127.

Execution of Contingency Plans

The sheriff and/or police officials are primarily responsible for the protection of personnel and property assigned to the judiciary and support staff. They are responsible for all security functions involving the courts and will be in direct control of all forces committed to supporting this plan to the extent of determining specific assignments for operational personnel.

¹ **Example:** Courthouse photographs and videos can be effectively used by law enforcement personnel and emergency responders who have never been inside the courthouse or are unfamiliar with the courthouse design and layout.

To maintain order during the execution of the contingency plan, it is important that all participants are aware of their duties and responsibilities. Below is a suggested breakdown of the role various agencies may play.

Primary Agencies

- **Sheriff and/or Police Officials** - Direct control of all forces committed to proper execution of this plan to include delegating assignments appropriate to the situation and the apprehension of suspects.
- **FBI and other Federal Law Enforcement** - Furnish investigative support, incident response teams, apprehend suspects, and provide intelligence information on situational aspects effecting (assessed and actual) the operation.
- **State and Local Law Enforcement** - Support assignments as determined by the sheriff and/or police officials. Provide personnel to secure and control areas adjacent to the operation site. Apprehend suspects under their jurisdictional authority.
- **Emergency Response Personnel** - First responders in providing medical care and treatment. Sheriff and/or police officials to determine levels of security and safety prior to organized response. Serve as technical advisors to sheriff and/or police officials on biological and chemical agents.
- **Military Assistance** - As determined by sheriff and/or police officials and governed by situational conditions, provide support services in the areas of tactical considerations, special equipment considerations, and personnel reinforcements.

Other Agencies

- **District Attorney** - legal assistance, guidance, and specific information
- **Courthouse Property Management** - knowledge of building electrical, mechanical, plumbing, construction, and site-specific space design features
- **Other Federal Agencies** - support services as required by primary agencies
- **State and Local Agencies** - support services as required by primary agencies
- **Telecommunication and Utility Companies** - support services as required
- **Elevator Contractors** - support services as required

Contingency Plans Based on Specific Situations

Suspicious Packages

Bombs can enter the courthouse in several ways, including the mail, in deliveries, and on individuals. Most mail bombs are set to explode when opened. Staff should be instructed to report all suspicious packages. A mail-screening program should be developed to detect mail bombs. To reduce the possibility of a bomb entering the courthouse, the court may want to purchase a machine that samples the air around a person being checked (these machines can detect the presence of nitrate molecules as small as one part per trillion). In the courthouse, security staff should search the facility regularly for bombs, especially in sensitive areas, such as the communications room or the power supply room.

Assessing the contents of a suspicious package with a fluoroscope requires that each x-ray image be evaluated and classified in one of four categories:

- **No Threat** - Defined as no identifying monitor image (shape, density, and/or color) that could be part of a weapon or improvised explosive device.
- **Contraband Item** - Defined as a suspicious or confirmed monitor image (shape, density, and/or color) indicating an item as been pre-identified as contraband.
- **Possible Threat** - Defined as a suspicious monitor image (shape, density, and/or color) that indicates a likelihood of weapons or an improvised explosive device.
- **Obvious Threat** - Defined as a confirmed monitor image (shape, density, and/or color) that indicates the presence of weapons or an improvised explosive device.

Shipped items that cannot be screened through a fluoroscope should require an agency contact to verify the shipping contents before the item will be allowed into the courthouse. Items that either meet threat profiles or are still deemed suspicious may require the sheriff and/or police department to implement the courthouse bomb-threat response plan.

Response Procedures for Suspicious Packages:

- Dependent upon the threat classification (possible or obvious), the court security officer will either immediately notify the sheriff or secure the area and immediately notify the sheriff.
- The court security officer(s) discovering the suspicious item will directly communicate all known information to responding sheriff's personnel.
- Court security officers will ensure any suspicious item is not moved from the location in which it was found. This is especially true for those items found inside and outside the courthouse environs, as detonation may correlate to motion.
- Court security officers will not discuss any aspect surrounding the discovery of a suspicious package or response actions with any member of the public, government employee, or other court security officers except as authorized in performance of official duties or as directed by the sheriff or his/her designee.
- Once a suspicious package is discovered, all radio traffic/communications will cease.
- Responding sheriff's personnel will determine the number and extent to which other courthouse personnel will be notified of the suspicious package.
- In attempts to confirm a suspicious package's contents, the recipient and sender should be identified, if possible, and contacted by the sheriff. If the suspicious item has not been tampered with, and the recipient and sender are aware the package is being delivered and can verify package contents, you have eliminated the likelihood of an explosive device.
- Sheriff's personnel should utilize the expertise of resident officers and agents (i.e. police department officials, ATF, postal inspectors, etc.) when and where available.
- The sheriff or his/her designee will determine whether and when it is necessary to call in the local bomb squad.
- Unless directed to do so by the sheriff or a designee (i.e. during attempts to verify a packages contents), court security officer personnel will not contact any agency official or employee regarding a suspicious package and the sheriff's response.
- When assigned a post (corridor, stairwell, elevator, etc.) to assist in securing a suspicious package, court security officers will make no specific statements to the public, media, or government employees concerning the assignment. When questioned, court security officers are only authorized to provide general information such as, "this area has been temporarily closed by the sheriff." At no time whatsoever will any court security officer make reference to any type of bomb (i.e. mail, letter, pipe, briefcase, package, etc.)
- Any judicial officer or government official insisting on more information will be directed to see the sheriff or a designee.
- The sheriff or a designee will determine whether to request assistance from building management. If requested, their personnel will provide support to the sheriff in technical, mechanical, custodial, and advisory capacities. Building management officials will be responsible for ensuring that their personnel, including contract employees, keep all communications regarding sheriff activities secure. This means they will refer all questions regarding any incident involving a suspicious package to the attention of the building manger, and at no time whatsoever will they refer to any type of bomb.
- In the event no assistance is requested of building management, the sheriff or a designee will keep building officials informed of incident events as they transpire.
- If a decision is made to evacuate the courthouse, the respective Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) and sheriff's courthouse contingency plan will be utilized. As the OEP contains information specific to sheriff operations, it is considered a departmental exclusive document and is not to be disseminated outside the agency. NOTE: Sheriff's personnel responsible for court and judicial security should be prepared to initiate evacuation procedures for court personnel if the sheriff or his/her designee determines it is in the best

interests (safety and security) for same. Court security officers will not discuss with any member of the public, media, or government the decision to or not to evacuate.

- Court security officers will conduct a comprehensive security sweep of court floors to ensure all persons have safely been evacuated from the building. Other than pre-identified judicial officers, all court officials/employees are directed to exit the building via emergency exits. Those judicial officers requiring assistance in exiting the courthouse will be assisted by court security office personnel. During evacuations, court security officers are also responsible for maintaining security, providing assistance, and giving direction.

When a decision has been made to contact the bomb squad, the sheriff and court security officer (as directed by the sheriff) will be responsible for the following:

- Providing all known information (who, what, why, when, where, and how) to the bomb squad upon their arrival.
- Confirmation from responding emergency and bomb squad personnel on what they expect and require for support.
- Maintaining a constant presence (appropriate/safe distances from the suspicious package) while responding to authorities are on-site.
- Being involved (as sheriff's representative) and consulted prior to any decision being made on taking action (i.e. detonation of the package with a water cannon) on-site.
- Sheriff's personnel should strongly discourage any attempt to open a suspicious package on-site. If there is no other choice, measures must be taken to:
 - advise and prepare courthouse occupants for the resulting noise and/or shock;
 - determine need for partial (i.e. offices and floors above, below, or adjacent to the suspicious package) or entire courthouse evacuation;
 - consider advantages (would potential damage levels be lowered?) and disadvantages (would moving the package cause it to detonate?) in moving the package to a more suitable, preferably off-site location;
 - if the package cannot be moved, a decision must be made regarding whether or not to reinforce areas (potential detonation and resulting blast effect must be taken into account) and cover equipment (screening systems are very expensive and all efforts should be made to prevent them from being damaged / building electrical and power systems) adjacent to the package; and
 - preserving evidence for subsequent crime scene investigation.

The sheriff's department will be responsible for obtaining copies of all other agency reports generated as a result of their involvement in responding to a suspicious package. After-action reports and case files (including other agency reports) should be reviewed by the sheriff or his/her designee.

The following characteristics may indicate the presence of a mail bomb:

- foreign mail, air mail, and special delivery;
- restrictive markings such as confidential, personal, etc.;
- excessive or no postage;
- handwritten or poorly typed address;
- incorrect titles with name;
- title with no name;
- misspellings of common words;
- oily stains or discoloration;
- no return address;
- excessive weight;
- rigid or bulky envelope;
- lopsided or uneven package/envelope;
- protruding wires or tinfoil;
- excessive securing material such as masking tape, string, etc.;
- visual distractions;
- strange odor;
- evidence of opening and resealing; or
- thickness greater than one inch.

Bomb Threat

All courthouse staff should be trained in the procedures for handling a bomb threat. The form on page 56 can be used to help staff gather important information if they receive a threatening telephone call.

The following table outlines the contingency plan procedures to undertaken if a bomb threat is received.

Bomb Threat Response Plan	
<p>RECEIPT OF THE THREAT</p> <p><i>Persons likely to receive bomb threats should be provided with a response form similar to the one depicted on page 56.</i></p>	<p>Obtaining accurate information is vital to selecting the appropriate response. The most frequent receipt of bomb threats is via telephone. Persons likely to receive such calls should be briefed and trained in the following procedures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Try to keep the caller on the line long enough to trace the call and obtain further information. • Record, in writing or by recorder, the exact words the caller used. Attempt to determine the exact location of the IED, device type, appearance, and time of detonation. • Attempt to determine the sex, age, and caller mental attitude - to include reasons for placing the IED. • Note any accent or peculiarity of speech that may help identify the caller, as well as any background noise that may provide a clue to the caller's identity and location.
<p>THREAT EVALUATION</p>	<p>This stage involves assessing the credibility of the message and selecting the appropriate response. The following are general points of consideration that should be taken into account when conducting the evaluation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • information ascertained from caller, • threat scope, • facility operations, • threat and risk assessments, • pre-identified vulnerabilities, • prior incident activity and response, • environmental conditions and factors, • area(s) of refuge, • preliminary search results, and • use of subject matter experts (public and private).
<p>FACILITY SEARCH</p>	<p>To search a building before or after it is evacuated is a matter that should be governed by situational aspects. The value of intelligence gathered during stage one, receipt of the actual bomb threat, becomes critically evident during this stage. If the information received indicates a definitive location, a search could be conducted without evacuation, provided that time is not a factor. cursory searches that have been delineated in contingency plans can also be conducted prior to any decision to evacuate the building.</p> <p>Building employees can be of great assistance in conducting a search, since emergency responders are likely to be unfamiliar with the facility and surrounding environs. Employees should be directed to report all out-of-place items to the immediate attention of pre-designated personnel. For those facilities with inherent or elevated threat/risk levels, efforts should be made to schedule on-site familiarization training for emergency responders.</p>
<p>FACILITY</p>	<p>Essentially, there are three alternatives available to officials when deciding building</p>

<p>EVACUATION</p> <p><i>The Threat Evaluation Process Plays An Integral Part In Considering and Determining Facility Evacuation</i></p>	<p>evacuation - (1) ignore the threat, (2) evacuate immediately, and (3) search and evacuate if warranted, considered by professionals to be the most desired approach. A general rule to follow if you do not have an established bomb threat response plan is evacuate. Unfortunately, this action is usually the exact effect a hoax bomber desires.</p> <p>As stated, an evacuation may occur before or after a search has been conducted. However, an outlined search of some type (i.e. cursory, general, inclusive, etc.) is strongly recommended prior to allowing building occupants to continue on with their current activities.</p> <p>Although total evacuations offer the highest degree of safety, situational aspects may allow less absolute, more incident-specific measures.</p>
<p>REMOVAL and RENDER SAFE</p>	<p>During this stage, only properly trained Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel should be involved. IED's are limited only by the imagination of their designers and should never be touched or moved by untrained persons.</p> <p>Knowing (1) who to contact, (2) how to contact, (3) what information they will need concerning the bomb threat/IED, and (4) response times is vital to any bomb threat response plan.</p>
<p>GENERAL</p> <p><i>A bomb threat response plan should specifically address and incorporate several areas:</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather telephone contact/notification information for management and command elements to ensure some officials are readily available to make critical decisions throughout the incident. • Determine what situational aspects dictate either immediate evacuation, ignoring the threat, or initiating a search and evacuating the facility if/when the threat is confirmed. • Identify search personnel and/or teams. • Establish search techniques. • Consider the possibility of secondary or diversionary devices. • Follow established policies and procedures if/when a device has been located. • Establish policies for handling employee, public, and news media inquiries. • Interface with Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Threat Response Plans.

The following diagrams provide information on types and components of explosives, or Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), as well as how to search for them.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)				
TYPES	CLASSIFICATION	EFFECT	DETONATION	METHOD
MECHANICAL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pipe Bombs • Mail Bombs • Booby Traps CHEMICAL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kerosene • Ammonia Nitrate • Gasoline NUCLEAR / ATOMIC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military • Terrorist 	<i>Determined according to the speed, expressed in feet per second, at which the change of state takes place.</i> HIGH <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TNT • Nitro • Plastic LOW <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Black Powder • Smokeless Powder 	BLAST <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positive & Negative Pressure Exerted • Primary Effect FRAGMENTATION <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IED Itself • Shrapnel From a Variety of Materials INCENDIARY <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Burning Effect • Damage is Environs Dictated 	SPARK FLAME SECONDARY DEVICE MILITARY FUSES	PRESSURE , used to release tension to cause motion. REMOTE CONTROL TIME <i>Four Types of Time</i> 1) Clock 2) Chemical 3) Burning 4) Electrical

Main Components of a Bomb and IED		
IGNITION SYSTEM <i>Initiation and Firing Devices</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Battery / Power Source • Electrical Sequencing • Non-Electrical Sequencing • Prima Cord • PETN 	DETONATOR <i>Primary Explosives</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blasting Cap • Flame • Spark • Military Fuses 	MAIN CHARGE <i>Secondary Explosives</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plastic (C-3 / C-4) • Powder • Chemical / Liquid • Dynamite • Ammonium Nitrate • TNT • Sheet Explosives

Inspecting Vehicles for Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

Conducting an external search

- Check the area around the vehicle. Look for tape, wire, string or fuses.
- Look for marks on the ground indicating unusual activity.
- Look for signs of forced entry.
- Look inside the vehicle through the window for devices, packages, or other suspicious items.

Locked Vehicles - *Check Below*

- Look for loose wires similar to blasting caps.
- Inspect top/sides of tires.
- Inspect exhaust pipe for inserted objects.
- Look for pieces of dirt, rust, etc, that may have been dislodged.

Unlocked Vehicles - *Check Inside*

- Look inside the vehicle through the windows and open a door other than the driver's.
- Inspect vehicle interior in a logical sequence. Start at floor and work up.
- Check under the floormats.
- Check under front and back seats.
- Check door panels for signs of tampering.

Conducting Room Searches for IEDs

- Stop, Look, and Listen
- Divide room by height for search - floor/waist waist/chin chin/ceiling ceiling/decking
- Search room by height and assigned area - overlap for thorough coverage
- Search internal public areas – men's/ladies' rooms, elevators, lobby, stairwells, office reception areas, etc.
- Search internal areas - utilize employee familiarity in locating/clearing out-of-place items
- Search outside areas - landscaping, trash receptacles, vehicles, abandoned items, signs, windows, doorways, building facade, etc.

Evacuations

The following items should be included in a contingency plan to deal with evacuations:

- Emergency telephone numbers for fire, police, medical, utilities, and relief agencies.
- Building floor plans are compiled under the building survey.
- A list of personnel and agencies to be notified in case of emergency.
- A list of persons responsible for evacuating and accounting for personnel. Assign floor monitors to each floor. Preassign an assembly point and require all floor monitors to report-in to ensure the entire building has been evacuated. The assembly point should be far enough away in case of explosion or vehicle traffic. Make sure physically challenged persons can get out of the building. Create a mechanism to notify persons when it is appropriate to return to the building.
- Procedures for evacuating jurors and prisoners.
- Procedures for maintaining the integrity of evidence.
- A checklist of areas to be secured and persons responsible for safes, vaults, treasure's office, clerk's office, record rooms, and weapon supply.

- Coordination and communication with other law enforcement agencies.
- Instructions for building personnel to remove personal effects and to follow evacuation orders in an orderly manner.

Demonstrations and Protests

Public demonstrations and protests are a Constitutionally protected right. Court security efforts must be balanced and concentrated to both respect this right and simultaneously provide for courthouse security. In the event of a planned demonstration or protest, personnel responsible for court security must assess, determine, and respond to a number of different situations—prior planning is essential when doing so. Efforts should be made to identify the protest organizer or leader in an attempt to determine the protest objective, and thereafter reach a mutually beneficial accord on dealing with agitators and disturbances.

Although demonstrations often do not require intervention by court security officers, the following incidents may occur during a demonstration that would require such intervention:

- multiple arrests,
- medical emergencies,
- disorderly conduct,
- acts of vandalism and arson,
- criminal assaults,
- interfering with courthouse operations,
- attempts to barricade courthouse entrances and exits, and
- civil disobedience.

A contingency plan aimed at preparing for and dealing with demonstrations and protests should include:

- intelligence information,
- demonstration size and cause,
- staffing requirements,
- inter-agency jurisdictional agreements,
- officer conduct,
- assembly locations,
- court orders and resulting enforcement,
- arrest procedures, locations, and holding facilities;
- medical facilities,
- chemical munitions deployment and protocol, and
- contingency and occupant emergency plans.

Hostage Situations

It is recommended that hostage situation exercises be conducted in all courthouses to familiarize police and emergency responders with procedures/requirements and the respective facilities design/layout.

Upon activation of any duress/panic alarm, an appropriate number of law enforcement and security personnel will be immediately dispatched to investigate and conduct a preliminary assessment. If it is determined that the alarm is real and a hostage situation exists, the following will be carried out by responding security personnel:

- Immediately establish a security perimeter for the affected area. The perimeter should extend in scope to provide for all entrances/exit points (i.e. stairwells, doors, elevators, windows, etc.) that the hostage taker(s) have access to.
- If not equipped initially, perimeter personnel should be outfitted with communications and other essential equipment as soon as practical.
- Request the assistance of those agencies and officials responsible for tactical responses and hostage

negotiations. Prior contact with these agencies and officials should have been initiated to confirm their assistance during hostage and emergency situations.

- Security personnel can expect to be utilized as technical advisors for the duration of incident. Consequently, it is incumbent upon and the responsibility of all personnel to continually familiarize themselves with their areas of responsibility and layouts of all courthouse space. These areas of responsibility include, but are not limited to: (1) familiarization of court appearances, (2) ability to access background information from computer databases, (3) acquired proficiency on the general design layout of courthouses and facilities housing court components, and (4) knowledgeable on the type, location, and operation of courthouse security systems.
- If necessary, provide for and organize the systematic evacuation of courtrooms, chambers, and other areas within the courthouse. Employees other than those of court agencies may also be affected by decisions to evacuate the building.
- The sheriff and/or police officials may designate call signs or codes to responding personnel. This will provide personnel with a means to confirm identity upon being challenged and/or replaced by responding tactical units. The designated command post is responsible for notifying other agency personnel of these assigned call signs.
- Security personnel assigned to security perimeters are to remain on post until replaced by responding tactical units. When replaced, security personnel will either: (1) establish and maintain an outer security perimeter while providing support, as directed, to tactical units, or (2) report to the command post for a tactical debriefing.
- All materials contained within the courthouse contingency plan will be made readily available to responding authorities.

Escape Contingencies

A contingency plan to respond to prisoner escape(s) or attempted escape(s) should include:

- sheriff and/or police response instructions,
- securing entrance and exits ,
- systematic utilization of courthouse security systems,
- search and arrest procedures,
- investigation and evidence procedures,
- witness interview and prisoner interrogation procedures,
- notification procedures for other state and federal law enforcement agencies,
- judicial and courthouse employee notification procedures,
- available assistance from resource agencies,
- public announcements and media news releases,
- security and threat advisories, and
- determination and procedures for courthouse evacuation.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Incidents

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency for dealing with Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) incidents and has therefore prepared incident contingency plans for each of these situations. The FBI should be contacted immediate in the event of a NBC incident. The following forms and tables can be used to help identify and respond to NBS incidents.

Chem-Bio: Quick Response Card (CB-QRC)

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Chemical Weapon (CW) Indicators		Biological Weapons (BW) Indicators	
<p>Suspicious Devices/Packages - unusual metal debris, abandoned spray devices, leaking packages, unexplained munitions</p> <p>Unusual Liquid, Spray or Vapor – droplets, oily film, unexplained odor, low lying clouds, fog unrelated to weather</p> <p>Dying or Dead Animals - lack of insects</p> <p>Unexplained Conditions or Casualties - serious illnesses, nausea, disorientation, difficulty breathing, convulsions, definite casualty patterns, multiple victims</p>		<p>Unusual Liquid, Spray or Vapor - spraying dispensers, suspicious devices or packages</p> <p>Unusual Conditions or Casualties - unusual illness for region/area, definite pattern inconsistent with natural diseases, human casualties</p> <p>Dying or Dead Animals - sick/dying animals or fish</p> <p>Unusual swarms of insects</p>	
Incident Response Key Contact Numbers			
U.S. Public Health Service #1-800-872-6367		U.S. Army Ops Center #1-800-851-8061	
Domestic Preparedness #1-800-368-6498		National Response Center #1-800-424-8802	
INITIAL ACTIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Remain Calm ▪ Don Protective Equipment ▪ Maintain Safe Position - Reassure Victims ▪ Await Properly Equipped Response 		
NOTIFICATION ESSENTIALS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Wind Direction and Weather Conditions ▪ Direction of Cloud or Vapor ▪ Number/Location of Victims - Types of Injuries - Symptoms ▪ Recommended Safe Access Route and Staging Area ▪ Witness Statements and Observations 		

Anthrax Concerns Card

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It is unlikely that you have been exposed to Anthrax, however, it is important to be alert to possible signs of infection. The following signs are symptoms of Anthrax exposure:

Fever / Malaise / Fatigue / Cough / Mild Chest Discomfort followed by Severe Respiratory Distress

While these are not absolute signs of infection, you should call the below number immediately:

(insert phone number of sheriff and/or police department)

Anthrax Facts Sheet

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- Clothing and other items worn at the time should be placed in plastic bags.
- Upon arriving home, shower with soap and water.
- If medication is prescribed it should be taken until you are instructed otherwise.
- Symptoms usually occur within 1-6 days.
- Initial symptoms are often followed by a short period of improvement (ranging in hours to 2-3 days).
- If severe symptoms are present, seek immediate medical attention.
- Anthrax can be successfully treated.
- There have not been any documented cases of human-to-human transmission.



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Request Form

Copies of the Courthouse Security Manual are available for purchase at \$20.00 per manual, which includes printing and postage costs. To request a copy of the Security Manual, please complete this form and remit payment to:

Fox Valley Technical College
 CJ Grants & Contracts
 Attn: Angie Balfe
 P.O. Box 2277
 Appleton, WI 54912-2277
 Ph: 920-735-2522 Fax: 920-996-7187
 E-mail: balfe@fvtc.edu

Please send _____ copies at \$20.00 per copy for a total of \$ _____. Please check payment option:
 Check or money order made payable to Fox Valley Technical College enclosed.
 Please charge my Master Card or VISA:

_____-_____-_____-_____
 Expiration Date (Mo/Yr): ____/____

 Authorized Signature Date

Requests for manuals are processed every Friday from our institution and mailed via the U.S. Postal Service.

Name: _____
 Title: _____ Agency: _____
 Street Address: _____
 City: _____ State: _____ Zip Code: _____
 Ph: _____ Fax: _____ E-mail: _____